This book assesses how Vatican II opened up the Catholic Church to encounter, dialogue, and engagement with other world religions. Opening with a contribution from the President of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, Cardinal Jean-Louis Tauran, it next explores the impact, relevance, and promise of the Declaration Nostra Aetate before turning to consider how Vatican II in general has influenced interfaith dialogue and the intellectual and comparative study of world religions in the postconciliar decades, as well as the contribution (...) of particular past and present thinkers to the formation of current interreligious and comparative theological methods. Additionally, chapters consider interreligious dialogue vis-à-vis theological anthropology in conciliar documents; openness to the spiritual practices of other faith traditions as a way of encouraging positive interreligious encounter; the role of lay and new ecclesial movements in interreligious dialogue; and the development of Monastic Interreligious Dialogue. Finally, it includes a range of perspectives on the fruits and future of Vatican’s II’s opening to particular faiths such as Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism. (shrink)

The purpose of this valuable book is to consider recent cultural trends in bioethics from a Catholic perspective. Bioethics is intended for a lay audience interested in understanding bioethical issues from a Catholic perspective.

Ever since Clifford Geertz urged the “blurring of genres” in the social sciences, many scholars have considered the crossing of disciplinary boundaries a healthy alternative to rigidly maintaining them. But what precisely does the metaphor of “blurring” imply? By unpacking the varieties of visual experiences that are normally grouped under this rubric, this essay seeks to provide some precision to our understanding of the implications of fuzziness. It extrapolates from the blurring caused by differential focal distances, velocities of objects in (...) the visual field, and competing perspectival vantage points to comparable effects in the intersection of different scholarly disciplines. Arguing against the holistic implications of Geertz's metaphor, as well as the even more totalizing concept of “consilience” introduced by E. O. Wilson, it suggests that blurring implies new types of complexity between or among those disciplines. (shrink)

This paper is an intervention in the debate inaugurated by Peter Harrison in 2002 when he called into question the validity of what has come to be called ‘the voluntarism and early-modern science thesis’. Though it subsequently drew support from such historians of science as J. E. McGuire, Margaret Osler, and Betty-Joe Teeter Dobbs, the origins of the thesis are usually traced back to articles published in 1934 and 1961 respectively by the philosopher Michael Foster and the historian of ideas (...) Francis Oakley. Central to Harrison’s critique of the thesis are claims he made about the meaning of the scholastic distinction between the potentia dei absoluta et ordinata and the role it played in the thinking of early-modern theologians and natural philosophers. This paper calls directly into question the accuracy of Harrison’s claims on that very matter. (shrink)

_International Library of the Philosophy of Education _reprints twenty-four distinguished texts published in this field over the last half-century and includes works by authors such as Reginald D. Archambault, Charles Bailey, Robin Barrow, Norman J. Bull, D. E. Cooper, R. F. Dearden, Kieran Egan, D. W. Hamlyn, Paul H. Hirst, Glenn Langford, D. J. O'Connor, T. W. Moore, D. A. Nyberg, R. W. K. Paterson, R. S. Peters, Kenneth A Strike, I. A. Snook, John and Patricia White, and John (...) Wilson. Themes discussed include: Liberal education, moral education, the aims of education, the education of teachers, adult & continuing education and the philosophical analysis of education. _Available now at a special introductory price. This price is applicable until 3 months after publication. For more information, please contact us._. (shrink)

This article is in part an intervention in the ongoing debate inaugurated by Peter Harrison in 2002 when he called into question the validity of what had come by then to be called ‘the voluntarism and science thesis.’ Though it subsequently drew support from such historians of science as J.E. McGuire, Margaret Osler, Betty Jo Teeter Dobbs and, more recently, John Henry (in rebuttal of Harrison), the origins of the thesis are usually traced back to articles published in 1934–1936 and (...) 1961 respectively by the philosopher Michael Foster and the historian of ideas Francis Oakley. While classifying Foster’s work as pertaining to the ecology of ideas rather than their history, the article argues for the complementarity of the two approaches and seeks, not only to vindicate the voluntarism and science thesis itself but also to locate it within the broader constellation of ideas embracing legal and political as well as natural philosophy that the political philosopher Michael Oakeshott characterized as pertaining to a fundamental tradition of European thinking dominated by the master conceptions of Will and Artifice. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Absolute and Ordained Power of God in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century TheologyFrancis Oakley[W]e must cautiously abandon [that more specious opinion of the Platonist and Stoick]... in this, that it... blasphemously invades the cardinal Prerogative of Divinity, Omnipotence, by denying him a reserved power, of infringing, or altering any one of those Laws which [He] Himself ordained, and enacted, and chaining up his armes in the adamantine fetters of Destiny.Walter (...) Charleton, The Darknes of Atheism Dispelled by the Light of Nature : A Physico-Theologicall Treatise (London, 1652)Of the various attributes characteristically ascribed to God in the Christian tradition—goodness, wisdom, omniscience, omnipotence, and the like—it is omnipotence which of recent years has most persistently been the object of focused attention among philosophers and historians alike. That that should be the case with philosophers working in the Anglo-American analytic tradition is not altogether surprising. While it is doubtless a development few would have predicted half a century ago, the years since then have seen something of a recrudescence of interest in a legislative or divine-command ethic. 1 Had that [End Page 437] not itself conspired to make omnipotence an obvious focus of philosophic attention, the deepening contemporaneous preoccupation with modal logic or the logic of possibility would surely have succeeded in so doing. Understood classically as affirming of God the ability to do all things and connoting a virtual capacity for action (as opposed to a power exercised in actuality), omnipotence has proven to be something of a troublesome notion, inviting unrestrained speculation about hypothetical divine action and generating a veritable cat’s cradle of philosophical conundrums concerning the relationship of God’s power to his will, wisdom, goodness, and justice.Medieval theologians and philosophers alike were forced to grapple with these taxing problems, 2 and philosophers of our own era have found them no less directly pertinent to their own logical and ethical concerns. 3 In 1955 Mackie inaugurated what was destined to become an ongoing discussion of omnipotence in the philosophical journals, 4 and such philosophers as Kenny and Keane, Cowan and Wolfe, Dummett, Plantinga, Swinburne, and Geach have been drawn into the fray. Since then, as a result, the pages of Mind, Philosophy, Philosophical Review, and even The Listener have been punctuated by their efforts to grapple with those venerable questions concerning the divine power that had exercised St. Peter Damiani in the mid-eleventh century, brought Abelard to grief a half-century later, and subsequently led Peter Lombard to devote to them a crucial and influential section of his Sentences—whether God of his omnipotence could undo the past, whether he could have made things other than he had, or created a world better than he did, and so on. 5 [End Page 438]While no medievalist can be expected to be anything but gratified by this unexpected testimony to the enduring significance and power of medieval scholastic concerns, those of us interested especially in the intellectual developments of the later-medieval centuries have particular reason to be energized by it. The years since Mackie launched this contemporary philosophical debate have also seen an intensification of interest on the part of historians in the ways in which, during these particular centuries, medieval thinkers themselves came to terms with the implications of the divine omnipotence and dealt with the theological and philosophical puzzles characteristically generated by that notion. Unlike the philosophers, whose concerns have been somewhat more broad-ranging, the historians have focused in particular on a quintessentially scholastic distinction that was developed, it has been said, “as a ‘yes and no’ answer to the question whether God is able to do or arrange things other than he did in creating the orders of nature and grace.” 6 The distinction in question is that between God’s power understood as absolute and as ordained (potentia dei absoluta et ordinata), which the theologians and philosophers of the period deployed as part of their great effort of accommodation between Greek philosophical and biblical notions of the divine, and the historical significance of which the scholarship of the past forty years has served increasingly to vindicate. 7 But while that distinction has been... (shrink)

From its very beginning, Pope Francis’s Petrine ministry has been full of surprises and he has been a man of contradictions. He has given hope to many, Christians, other believers, and secular humanists, especially with his pastoral approach of mercy, but he has also met with fierce opposition, even among the upper echelon of the hierarchy, some of whom have publicly attacked his orthodoxy and called for his resignation. In his teachings on evangelization, marriage and sexuality, ecology, and social (...) friendship, Francis has opened new paths and challenged the church to make visible the merciful face of God to the world.On interreligious dialogue, the pope, as to be expected, has largely reiterated the teachings of Vatican II and so far has not issued an apostolic exhortation or encyclical on the subject. Consistent with his pastoral outlook he has emphasized the socio-political and cultural aspects of interreligious dialogue and has largely avoided still controverted doctrinal issues. On the other hand, his friendship with many non-Christian leaders and his several obiter dicta have enlarged the interreligious horizon and opened the door for further explorations in the theology of religion and the scope of the interreligious encounter. His explicit acknowledgment of non-Christian religions as “channels” of the Holy Spirit hints at their role as ways of salvation not only for their adherents but also in certain ways for Christians. Furthermore, the four principles of Francisian metaphysics suggest novel and effective ways of conducting interreligious dialogue. (shrink)

Nowadays it is well known among historians of science that Francis Bacon, one of the modern defender of the experimental method, owed much of his thoughts to the chemical or alchemical tradition (cf. e.g., Gregory 1938, West 1961, Linden 1974, and Rees 1977). In fact, alchemy, particularly in the Arabic tradition, was always based on laboratory investigations by carefully examining the results of controlled manipulation of materials.1 It is also well known that Francis Bacon’s appeal to the experimental (...) method was severe criticism of scholasticism in philosophy of nature and, in particular, of authority as the basis of knowledge.2 If we compare philosophy of nature in the early 17th century with phi-. (shrink)

As the Zika virus pandemic continues to bring worry and fear to health officials and medical scientists, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and World Health Organization (WHO) have recommended that residents of the Zika-infected countries, e.g., Brazil, and those who have traveled to the area should delay having babies which may involve artificial contraceptive, particularly condom. This preventive policy, however, is seemingly at odds with the Roman Catholic Church’s position on the contraceptive. As least since the promulgation of (...) Paul VI’s 1968 encyclical, Humanae Vitae, the Church has explicitly condemned artificial birth control as intrinsic evil. However, the current pontiff, Pope Francis, during his recent visit to Latin America, remarked that the use of artificial contraception may not be in contradiction to the teaching of Humanae Vitae while drawing a parallel between the current Zika Crisis and the 1960’s Belgian Congo Nun Controversy. The pope mentioned that the traditional ethical principle of the lesser of two evils may be the doctrine that justified the exceptions. The authors of this paper attempt to expand the theological rationale of the pope’s suggestion. In so doing, the authors rely on casuistical reasoning as an analytic tool that compares the Belgian Congo Nun case and the given Zika case, and suggest that the former is highly similar to, if not the same as, the latter in terms of normative moral feature. That is, in both cases the use of artificial contraception is theologically justified in reference to the criteria that the doctrine of the lesser of two evils requires. The authors wish that the paper would provide a solid theological-ethical ground based on which condom-use as the most immediate and effective preventive measure can be recommended in numerous Catholic hospitals as well as among Catholic communities in the world, particularly the most Zika-affected and largest Catholic community in the world, Brazil – 123 million present Brazilian citizens are reported to be Roman Catholic. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:ROBERT ORFORD'S ATTACK ON GILES OF ROME I N TWO PREVIOUS ARTICLES, I tried to demonstrate how Robert Orford drew upon the thought of Giles of Rome in order to formulate his own explanation of hylomorphism and the so-called real distinction between essence and existence.1 Orford, it will be remembered, was one of the earliest disciples of his colleague St. Thomas Aquinas, and-more important- is the first 'llhomist we (...) know of who turned to Giles in order to gain an understanding of these basic philosophic problems, and who wove Giles's ideas into his own elaboration of what he took to be St. Thomas's position regarding them. In view of this recognition of Giles as an appropriate guide to a Thomist grasp of these issues, it is surprising to find among Orford's works the Reprobationes dfotorUJn a fratre Egidio in primum Sententiarum.2 The Reprobationes is a strange document. In it, as I shall show later, Orford seeks every opportunity to find fault with Giles. Indeed, his criticisms, hardly ever of any substance, are at times so "picky" they cause the reader to wonder as to his real purpose in writing them down in the first place. In this article, I shall review the historical context of the Reprobationes and try to show what it was about Giles of Rome that so irritated the Dominican Orford. The early catalogues contain no more than two entries for 1 See F. Kelley, "The Egidean influence in Robert Orford's doctrine on Form", Thomist, 47, 1, January, 1983, pp. 77-99, and "Two early English Thomists: Thomas Sutton and Robert Orford vs. Henry of Ghent", Thomist, 45, 3, July, 1981, pp. 345-387. 2 This work is extant in one manuscript, viz. MS. Merton 276, fol. 20ra50ra. It has been edited by A. Vella: Robert d'Orford Reprobationes dictorum a fratre Egidio in primum Sententiarum, Paris, 1968. 70 ROBERT ORFORD'S ATTACK ON GILES OF ROME 71 Orford.3 However, from references he made in his extant writings, viz., Sciendum, Contra dicta Henrici and Reprobationes, we know the titles at least of some of his other writings. As one might have expected, Orford wrote commentaries on the books of the Sentences. In addition to the references to these commentaries he mentions also a De unitate formae, Super 2 de sommo et vigilia, Super 6 de M etaphysica and De generatione. We know of Orford's part in certain disputed questions and of his sermon in rn93. Finally, we have offered our reasons elsewhere for attributing to him the opuscule entitled De natura materiae et dimensionibus interminatis.4 From the mere fact that Orford saw the necessity of writing against Giles of Rome in defense of St. Thomas Aquinas, one might have thought that in Giles one had found an antagonist of the Angelic Doctor. For a long time Giles was taken to have been not an adversary but rather a stout defender of his teacher, St. Thomas.5 The picture of Giles of Rome as the loyal Thomist, the legend as it has more recently been labelled, derived in no small measure from the erroneous ascription to him of the work which is in fact Richard Knapwell's, viz. Correctivum corruptorii 'Quare '.6 Once this mistaken ascription had been corrected and further study was done, mainly by E. Hocedez, Giles no longer appeared as having been the staunch and loyal Thomist of the legend. On the contrary, Hocedez says of him: Gilles decidement n'est pas le thomiste, clans le sens profond du mot, qui s'est donne Thomas pour Maitre et guide de sa pensee: a For a full account of what the catalogues have under Orford's name, see A. Vella, "Robert of Orford and his place in the scholastic controversies at Oxford in the late xiiith century" (Oxford Univ. B.Litt. thesis 1946), MS. B.Litt., c. 30, vol. 1, Bodleian Library, pp. 12-27. 4 See F. Kelley," The Egidean influence", pp. 90-96. 5 See F. Lajard, "Gilles de Rome", Histoire litteraire de la France, 30 (1888), pp. 421-566. 6 "Nous croyons que ce qui a le plus contribue a faire... (shrink)

Philosophy in Africa has come a long way. From the 18th and 19th centuries when it was totally ignored or denied altogether, to when it was given a lower status by ethnophilosophers. Today we talk proudly of an African philosophy. What is often forgotten is its history and the players behind its historical moments. This paper tells the story of how racial ideology had defined the course of philosophy in Africa. We are particularly concerned with telling the story of Henry (...) Odera Oruka, and how he contributed to raising the status of philosophy in Africa. (shrink)

Animal ethicists have recently debated the ethical questions raised by disenhancing animals to improve their welfare. Here, we focus on the particular case of breeding hens for commercial egg-laying systems to become blind, in order to benefit their welfare. Many people find breeding blind hens intuitively repellent, yet ‘welfare-only’ positions appear to be committed to endorsing this possibility if it produces welfare gains. We call this the ‘Blind Hens’ Challenge’. In this paper, we argue that there are both empirical and (...) theoretical reasons why even those adopting ‘welfare-only’ views should be concerned about breeding blind hens. But we also argue that alternative views, which (for example) claim that it is important to respect the telos or rights of an animal, do not offer a more convincing solution to questions raised by the possibility of disenhancing animals for their own benefit. (shrink)

Towards the end of Plutarch's treatise de Pytkiae oraculis Theon quotes a short passage of verse but does not identify its author. The fragment is now customarily printed among the remains of Pindar's Parthenea, most recently by Snell.

In this article, I respond to important questions raised by Gallagher and Jacobson in the field of cognitive science about face-to-face interactions in Heidegger’s account of ‘intersubjectivity’ in Being and Time. They have criticized his account for a lack of attention to primary intersubjectivity, or immediate, face-to-face interactions; he favours, they argue, embodied interactions via objects. I argue that the same assumption underlies their argument as did earlier critiques of a lack of an account of the body in Heidegger ; (...) namely that because the body is not explicitly discussed in Being and Time, embodiment, rather than stressing the immediacy of experience, is insufficiently acknowledged in his emphasis on ‘being-in-the-world’. Through placing Gallagher and Jacobson’s accounts of intersubjectivity and the body alongside Heidegger’s accounts of Mitsein and Leib, this article shows Heidegger’s radical position on the body as immersed in a holistic environment, and its reverberations on his account of intersubjectivity. I argue that Dasein’s embodied engagement in the world is always one of immediacy and that the body of the other is perceived as ‘tied into’ its context, as well. In so doing, I offer an Heideggerian account of ecstatic involvement which moves away from the distinction between primary and secondary intersubjectivity toward an immediate engagement with objects and people always already ‘tied into’ a context; an account that, through the concept of Fürsorge, includes shifts of attention between objects and people that allow for the ethical distinctions Gallagher and Jacobson are looking for. (shrink)